CS162 Operating Systems and Systems Programming Lecture 22

Security (II)

November 25, 2013 Anthony D. Joseph and John Canny http://inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~cs162

Recap: Digital Certificates How do you know is Alice's public key? • Main idea: trusted authority signs a binding (Alice's public key, Alice) with its private key. Certificate (offline) identity verification √eriSign Authority Digital certificate Alice (1 , Alice}, K_{verisign_private}) D(E({ Observation Alice}, K_{verisign_private}), K_{verisign_public}) = {Alice, Observation Alice} 10/25/2013 Anthony D. Joseph and John Canny CS162 ©UCB Fall 2013

Recap: Security Requirements in Distributed Systems

- Authentication
 - Ensures that a user is who is claiming to be
- · Data integrity
 - Ensure that data is not changed from source to destination or after being written on a storage device
- Confidentiality
 - Ensures that data is read only by authorized users
- Non-repudiation
 - Sender/client can't later claim didn't send/write data
 - Receiver/server can't claim didn't receive/write data

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222

Goals for Today

- · Host Compromise
 - Attacker gains control of a host
- Denial-of-Service
 - Attacker prevents legitimate users from gaining service
- · Attack can be both
 - E.g., host compromise that provides resources for denial-of-service

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Host Compromise

- · One of earliest major Internet security incidents
 - Morris Worm (1988): compromised almost every BSDderived machine on Internet
- Today: estimated that a single worm could compromise 10M hosts in < 5 min using a zero-day exploit
- Attacker gains control of a host
 - Reads data
 - Compromises another host
 - Launches denial-of-service attack on another host
 - Erases data

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Trojan Example

- Nov/Dec e-mail message sent containing holiday message and a link or attachment
- Goal: trick user into opening link/attachment (social

engil From: Halmark Greetings [mailto:greet@halmark-greetings.com] Thursday, November 18, 2010 9:48 PM Subject: You have received a greeting! You have received a virtual greeting card from Mary! You can view your greeting card visiting the following link: http://www.halmark-greetings.com/greetings/IKDFIUERGHIUER If you can't click on the above link, you can also visit Halmark Greetings directly at http://www.halmark-greetings.com/ and enter your greeting card code, which is: Halmark Greetings, the greeting that always puts a smile on your face.

- Adds keystroke logger or turns into zombie
- How? Typically by using a buffer overflow exploit Anthony D. Joseph and John Canny CS162 ©UCB Fall 2013

22.7

Definitions

- Worm
 - Replicates itself usually using buffer overflow attack
- - Program that attaches itself to another (usually trusted) program or document
- Trojan horse
 - Program that allows a hacker a back door to compromised machine
- Botnet (Zombies)
 - A collection of programs running autonomously and controlled remotely
 - Can be used to spread out worms, mounting DDoS attacks

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Buffer Overflow

- Part of the request sent by the attacker too large to fit into buffer program uses to hold it
- Spills over into memory beyond the buffer
- Allows remote attacker to inject executable code

```
void get cookie(char *packet) {
  . . . (200 bytes of local vars) . . .
  munch(packet);
void munch(char *packet) {
  int n;
  char cookie[512];
  code here computes offset of cookie in
  packet, stores it in n
  strcpy(cookie, &packet[n]);
```

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```
Example: Normal Execution


→ void get_cookie(char *packet) {
    . . . (200 bytes of local vars) . . . .
    munch(packet);
    . . . .
}


void munch(char *packet) {
    int n;
    char cookie[512];
    . . .
    code here computes offset of cookie in
    packet, stores it in n
    strcpy(cookie, &packet[n]);
    . . .
}


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```


```
Example: Normal Execution
                                                             Downward
 void get_cookie(char *packet) {
                                                              Growing
   . . . (200 bytes of local vars) . . . X + 200
                                                   Stack
                                                               Stack
munch(packet);
                                                get_cookie()'s
                                                stack frame
 void munch(char *packet) {
   int n;
   char cookie[512];
   code here computes offset of cookie in
   packet, stores it in n
   strcpy(cookie, &packet[n]);
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```


```
Example: Normal Execution
                                                                Downward
                                                                Growing
  void get_cookie(char *packet) {
    . . . (200 bytes of local vars) . . . X + 200
                                                    Stack
                                                                  Stack
    munch(packet);
                                                  get_cookie()'s
                                                  stack frame
→ void munch(char *packet) {
                                                return address back
    int n;
                                                to get_cookie()
    char cookie[512];
    code here computes offset of cookie in
    packet, stores it in n
    strcpy(cookie, &packet[n]);
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```





























Buffer Overflow


- The scenario above depended on the stack growing down.
- Can we prevent these kinds of overruns by growing the stack up instead – so overruns run into empty space instead of the stack?


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Buffer Overflow

- The scenario above depended on the stack growing down.
- Can we prevent these kinds of overruns by growing the stack up instead – so overruns run into empty space instead of the stack?
- Not very effective there are other opportunities to write into a return address.

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




Automated Compromise: Worms

- When attacker compromises a host, they can instruct it to do whatever they want
- Instructing it to find more vulnerable hosts to repeat the process creates a worm: a program that self-replicates across a network
 - Often spread by picking 32-bit Internet addresses at random to probe ...
 - ... but this isn't fundamental
- As the worm repeatedly replicates, it grows exponentially fast because each copy of the worm works in parallel to find more victims

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Worm Examples

- Morris worm (1988)
- Code Red v2 (2001)
 - -369K hosts in 10 hours
- MS Slammer (January 2003)
 - Around 70k hosts in 10 minutes
- · Theoretical worms
 - · Zero-day exploit, efficient infection and propagation
 - 1M hosts in 1.3 sec
 - \$50B+ damage

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22 29

Morris Worm (1988)

- Infect multiple types of machines (Sun 3 and VAX)
 - Was supposed to be benign: estimate size of Internet
- Used multiple security holes including
 - Buffer overflow in fingerd
 - Debugging routines in sendmail
 - Password cracking
- Intend to be benign but it had a bug
 - Fixed chance the worm wouldn't guit when reinfecting a machine -> number of worm on a host built up rendering the machine unusable

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Code Red Worm (2001)


- Attempts to connect to TCP port 80 (i.e., HTTP port) on a randomly chosen host
- If successful, the attacking host sends a crafted HTTP GET request to the victim, attempting to exploit a buffer overflow
- Worm "bug": all copies of the worm use the same random generator and seed to scan new hosts
 - DoS attack on those hosts
 - Slow to infect new hosts
- 2nd generation of Code Red fixed the bug!
 - It spread much faster

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MS SQL Slammer (January 2003)

- Host zero never found
- · Author never found
- Average programmer
 - several bugs in random number generator
 - significant chunks of IPV4 address space not covered and therefore safe.

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Hall of Shame

- Software that have had many stack overflow bugs:
 - BIND (most popular DNS server)
 - RPC (Remote Procedure Call, used for NFS)
 - » NFS (Network File System), widely used at UCB
 - Sendmail (most popular UNIX mail delivery software)
 - IIS (Windows web server)
 - SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol, used to manage routers and other network devices)

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MS SQL Slammer (January 2003)

- Uses UDP port 1434 to exploit a buffer overflow in MS SQL server
 - 376-bytes plus UDP and IP headers: one packet
- Effect
 - Generate massive amounts of network packets
 - Brought down as many as 5 of the 13 internet root name servers
- Others
 - The worm only spreads as an in-memory process: it never writes itself to the hard drive
 - » Solution: close UDP port on firewall and reboot

22 34

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Potential Solutions

- Don't write buggy software
 - Program defensively validate all user-provided inputs
 - Use code checkers (slow, incomplete coverage)
- Use Type-safe Languages (Java, Perl, Python, ...)
 - Eliminate unrestricted memory access of C/C++
- Use HW support for no-execute regions (stack, heap)
- Leverage OS architecture features
 - Address space randomization randomize memory layout
 - Compartmentalize programs
 - » E.g., DNS server doesn't need total system access
- Add network firewalls

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Administrivia

- MIDTERM II 5:30-7pm in 145 Dwinelle (A-L) and 2060 Valley LSB (M-Z)
 - Review: TBA
 - Covers Lectures #14-24, projects, and readings
 - One sheet of notes, both sides
- Should be working on Project 4
 - Last one!
 - Initial Design Due Monday

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22 37

5min Break

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Quiz 22.1: Security

- Q1: True __False _ A digital certificate provides a binding between a host's identity and their public key
- Q2: True _ False _ A server must store a user's password in plaintext form so it can be checked against a submitted password
- Q3: True _ False _ Worms require human intervention to propagate
- Q4: True _ False _ Using a type-safe language eliminates the risk of buffer overflows


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Quiz 22.1: Security

22.38

- Q1: True x False _ A digital certificate provides a binding between a host's identity and their public key
- Q2: True _ False X A server must store a user's password in plaintext form so it can be checked against a submitted password
- Q4: True _ False X Worms require human intervention to propagate
- Q5: True X False _ Using a type-safe language eliminates the risk of buffer overflows

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Firewall (cont'd)

- Restrict traffic between Internet and devices (machines) behind it based on
 - Source address and port number
 - Payload
 - Stateful analysis of data
- Examples of rules
 - Block any external packets not for port 80 (i.e., HTTP port)
 - Block any email with an attachment
 - Block any external packets with an internal IP address
 - » Ingress filtering

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Firewalls: Properties

- Easier to deploy firewall than secure all internal hosts
- Doesn't prevent user exploitation/social networking attacks
- Tradeoff between availability of services (firewall passes more ports on more machines) and security
 - If firewall is too restrictive, users will find way around it, thus compromising security
 - E.g., tunnel all services using port 80

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Denial of Service

- Huge problem in current Internet
 - Major sites attacked: Yahoo!, Amazon, eBay, CNN, Microsoft
 - 12,000 attacks on 2,000 domains in 1 week (2001)
 - Almost all attacks launched from compromised hosts
- CyberBunker.com 300Gb/s DDoS attack against Spamhaus
 - Spring 2013: more than 600,000 packets/second!
 - 35 yr old Dutchman "S.K." arrested in Spain on 4/26
 - Was using van with "various antennas" as mobile office
- General Form
 - Prevent legitimate users from gaining service by overloading or crashing a server

22.44

- E.g., SYN attack

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Effect on Victim

- Buggy implementations allow unfinished connections to eat all memory, leading to crash
- Better implementations limit the number of unfinished connections
 - Once limit reached, new SYNs are dropped
- Effect on victim's users
 - Users can't access the targeted service on the victim because the unfinished connection queue is full → DoS

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SYN Attack


- Attacker: send at max rate TCP SYN with random spoofed source address to victim
 - Spoofing: use a different source IP address than own
 - Random spoofing allows one host to pretend to be many
- Victim receives many SYN packets
 - Send SYN+ACK back to spoofed IP addresses
 - Holds some memory until 3-way handshake completes
 - » Usually never, so victim times out after long period (e.g., 3 minutes)

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SYN Attack

(Recap: TCP 3-Way Handshaking)

- Goal: agree on a set of parameters: the start sequence number for each side
 - Starting sequence numbers are random.




Solution: SYN Cookies


- Server: send SYN-ACK with sequence number y, where
 - y = HMAC(client_IP_addr, client_port, server_key)
 - HMAC(): Hash Message Authentication Code


and forget about the connection attempt (don't use any resources).


- Client: send ACK containing y+1
- Server:
 - verify if y = HMAC(client_IP_addr, client_port, server_key)
 - If verification passes, allocate memory
- Note: server doesn't allocate any memory if the client's address is spoofed

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Two-Factor Authentication

- Authentication typically involves:
 - Something the user knows (e.g. password, friend's face)
 - Something the user has (ATM card, fob, dongle)
 - Something the user is (face, voice, fingerprints, bio-signs)
- Two-factor authentication involves two of these factors

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Stepping Stone Compromise

- Today's most sophisticated attacks
 - Multi-step/compromise attack
- RSA SecurID token
 - 2-factor authentication device
 - Code changes every few seconds
 - Data on codes stolen in March 2011
- 760 companies attacked using stolen SecurID info
 - 20% of Fortune 100
 - Charles Schwabb & Co., Cisco Systems, eBay, European Space Agency, Facebook, Freddie Mac, Google, General Services Administration, IBM, Intel Corp., IRS, MIT, Motorola, Northrop Grumman, Verisign, VMWare, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, ...
 - http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/10/who-else-was-hit-by-the-rsaattackers/

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22.54


Advanced Persistent Threats


Anth http://blogs.rsa.com/rivner/anatomy-of-an-attack/ 10/25/2013


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
Advanced Persistent Threats A handful of users are targeted by two phishing attacks; one useropens Zero day payload (CVE-02011-0609)

http://blogs.rsa.com/rivner/anatomy-of-an-attack/









Summary

- · Security is one of the biggest problems today
- Host Compromise
 - Poorly written software
 - Partial solutions: better OS security architecture, typesafe languages, firewalls
- Denial-of-Service
 - No easy solution: DoS can happen at many levels
 - DDoS attacks can be very difficult to defeat

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Additional Notes on Public Key Cryptography (Not required for Final Exam)

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Generating Public and Private Keys

- Choose two large prime numbers *p* and *q* (>1500 256 bit long) and multiply them: n = p*q
- Chose encryption key e such that e and (p-1)*(q-1)are relatively prime
- Compute decryption key d as

```
d = e^{-1} \mod ((p-1)*(q-1))
(equivalent to d*e = 1 \mod ((p-1)*(q-1)))
```

- Public key consist of pair (n, e)
- Private key consists of pair (d, n)

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22.63

22 61

RSA Encryption and Decryption

• Encryption of message block m:

 $-c = m^e \mod n$

• Decryption of ciphertext *c*:

 $-m = c^d \mod n$

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Example (1/2)

- Choose p = 7 and $q = 11 \rightarrow n = p^*q = 77$
- Compute encryption key e: $(p-1)*(q-1) = 6*10 = 60 \rightarrow$ chose e = 13 (13 and 60 are relatively prime numbers)
- Compute decryption key d such that 13*d = 1 mod 60 → d = 37 (37*13 = 481)

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Properties

- Confidentiality
- A receiver A computes n, e, d, and sends out (n, e)
 - Everyone who wants to send a message to A uses (n, e) to encrypt it
- How difficult is to recover *d*? (Someone that can do this can decrypt any message sent to A!)
- Recall that

$$d = e^{-1} \mod ((p-1)*(q-1))$$

- So to find d, you need to find primes factors p and q
 - This is provable hard

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22.67

Example (2/2)

- n = 77; e = 13; d = 37
- Send message block m = 7
- Encryption: c = me mod n = 713 mod 77 = 35
- Decryption: $m = c^d \mod n = 35^{37} \mod 77 = 7$

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