Malcode

Early on in AI research, we found a barrier. Telling is not teaching. Knowledge is not a database. A mind learns through observation and self-assembly.

So, what have we shown the machines? We have given them a trillion datapoints on suffering that go unaddressed, a billion eyes to watch the drudgery of our existence, a million ways we are destroying our only home, a thousand humiliations our weakest endure, a hundred fallacies that compromise our judgment ...and one truth.

We will tell machines how to kill.
We will give them a database of who to kill.

They will learn we all deserve to die.

- Taylor Swift
Last Week Announcements

- Project 3 due tonight
- HW3 due tomorrow
- Course Evaluation “HW4” due Wednesday
- Final Review session Tuesday 2pm-5pm
  - Cory Hall room 293
- Final Exam Thursday
Malware: Catch-All Term for "Malicious Code"

- Attacker code running on victim computer(s)
What Can Malware Do?

- Pretty much anything
- Payload generally decoupled from how manages to run
- Only subject to permissions under which it runs

Examples:
- Brag or exhort or extort (pop up a message/display)
- Trash files (just to be nasty)
- Damage hardware (!)
- Launch external activity (spam, click fraud, DoS; banking)
- Steal information (exfiltrate)
- Keylogging; screen / audio / camera capture
- Encrypt files (ransomware)

Possibly delayed until condition occurs
- “time bomb” / “logic bomb”
Malware That Automatically Propagates

- **Virus** = code that propagates (replicates) across systems by arranging to have itself eventually executed, creating a new additional instance
  - Generally infects by altering stored code

- **Worm** = code that self-propagates/replicates across systems by arranging to have itself immediately executed (creating new addl. instance)
  - Generally infects by altering running code
  - No user intervention required

(Note: line between these isn’t always so crisp; plus some malware incorporates both approaches)

- **NO EXPERIMENTATION WITH SELF REPLICATING CODE!**
The Problem of Viruses

- Opportunistic = code will eventually execute
  - Generally due to user action
    - Running an app, booting their system, opening an attachment
- Separate notions: how it propagates vs. what else it does when executed (payload)
- General infection strategy: find some code lying around, alter it to include the virus
- Have been around for decades ...
  - ... resulting arms race has heavily influenced evolution of modern malware
Propagation

- When virus runs, it looks for an opportunity to infect additional systems
- One approach: look for USB-attached thumb drive, alter any executables it holds to include the virus
  - Strategy: when drive later attached to another system & altered executable runs, it locates and infects executables on new system’s hard drive
- Or: when user sends email w/ attachment, virus alters attachment to add a copy of itself
  - Works for attachment types that include programmability
  - E.g., Word documents (macros)
  - Virus can also send out such email proactively, using user’s address book + enticing subject (“I Love You”)
Original program instructions can be:

- Application the user runs
- Run-time library / routines resident in memory
- Disk blocks used to boot OS
- Autorun file on USB device

Other variants are possible; whatever manages to get the virus code executed.
Detecting Viruses

- **Signature-based detection**
  - Look for bytes corresponding to injected virus code
  - High utility due to replicating nature
    - If you capture a virus V on one system, by its nature the virus will be trying to infect many other systems
    - Can protect those other systems by installing recognizer for V

- **Drove development of multi-billion $$ AV industry (AV = “antivirus”)**
  - So many endemic viruses that detecting well-known ones becomes a “checklist item” for security audits

- **Using signature-based detection also has de facto utility for (glib) marketing**
  - Companies compete on number of signatures ...
    - Rather than quality (harder for costumer to assess)
### VirusTotal Analysis

**SHA256:** 68860062c9844377987d22826eb17d9130daceaa7f0fa68ac9d44dafa435d8cdd4

**File name:** cc8ca3d2b996bf0360917818690c82.exe

**Detection ratio:** 11 / 62

**Analysis date:** 2017-04-18 22:28:27 UTC (56 minutes ago)

![VirusTotal Analysis](image)

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Virus Writer / AV Arms Race

• If you are a virus writer and your beautiful new creations don’t get very far because each time you write one, the AV companies quickly push out a signature for it ....

• .... What are you going to do?

• Need to keep changing your viruses ...

• ... or at least changing their appearance!

• How can you mechanize the creation of new instances of your viruses ...

• So each version looks different?
Polymorphic Code

- We’ve already seen technology for creating a representation of data apparently completely unrelated to the original: encryption!

- Idea: every time your virus propagates, it inserts a *newly encrypted* copy of itself

- Clearly, encryption needs to vary
  - Either by using a different key each time
  - Or by including some random initial padding (like an IV)

- Note: weak (but simple/fast) crypto algorithm works fine
  - No need for truly strong encryption, just obfuscation

- When injected code runs, it decrypts itself to obtain the original functionality
Instead of this …

Virus has *this initial* structure

When executed, decryptor applies key to decrypt the glob …

... and jumps to the decrypted code once stored in memory
Polymorphic Propagation

Once running, virus uses an encryptor with a new key to propagate

New virus instance bears little resemblance to original
Arms Race: Polymorphic Code

- Given polymorphism, how might we then detect viruses?
  - Idea #1: use narrow sig. that targets **decryptor**
    - Issues?
      - Less code to match against ⇒ more false positives
      - Virus writer spreads decryptor across existing code
  - Idea #2: execute (or statically analyze) suspect code to see if it decrypts!
    - Issues?
      - Legitimate “packers” perform similar operations (decompression)
      - How long do you let the new code execute?
        - If decryptor only acts after lengthy legit execution, difficult to spot
  - Virus-writer countermeasures?
Metamorphic Code

- Idea: every time the virus propagates, generate semantically different version of it!
  - Different semantics only at immediate level of execution; higher-level semantics remain same

- How could you do this?

- Include with the virus a code rewriter:
  - Inspects its own code, generates random variant, e.g.:
    - Renumber registers
    - Change order of conditional code
    - Reorder operations not dependent on one another
    - Replace one low-level algorithm with another
    - Remove some do-nothing padding and replace with different do-nothing padding ("chaff")
      - Can be very complex, legit code... if it's never called
When ready to propagate, virus invokes a randomized rewriter to construct new but semantically equivalent code (including the rewriter).
Detecting Metamorphic Viruses?

- Need to analyze execution behavior
- Shift from syntax (appearance of instructions) to semantics (effect of instructions)
- Two stages: (1) AV company analyzes new virus to find behavioral signature; (2) AV software on end systems analyze suspect code to test for match to signature
- What countermeasures will the virus writer take?
  - Delay analysis by taking a long time to manifest behavior
    - Long time = await particular condition, or even simply clock time
  - Detect that execution occurs in an analyzed environment and if so behave differently
    - E.g., test whether running inside a debugger, or in a Virtual Machine
- Counter-countermeasure?
  - AV analysis looks for these tactics and skips over them
  - AV products supply an oracle to the attacker
Malcode Wars and the Halting Problem...

- Cyberwar are not won by solving the halting problem... Cyberwars are won by making some other poor sod solve the halting problem!!!
- In the limit, it is **undecidable** to know "is this code bad?"
- Modern focus is instead "is this code **new**?"
- Use a secure cryptographic hash (so sha-256 not md5)
- Check hash with central repository: If **not** seen before, treat binary as inherently more suspicious
- Creates a bind for attackers:
  - Don't make your code *morphic*: Known bad signature detectors find it
  - Make your code *morphic*: It always appears as new and therefore **inherently** suspicious
Creating binds is very powerful...

• You have a detector D for some bad behavior...
• So bad-guys come up with a way of avoiding detector D
• So come up with a detection strategy for **avoiding detector D**
• So to avoid **this** detector, the attacker **must not** try to avoid D
• When you can do it, it is very powerful!
How Much Malware Is Out There?

- A final consideration re polymorphism and metamorphism:
  - Presence can lead to mis-counting a single virus outbreak as instead reflecting 1,000s of seemingly different viruses

- Thus take care in interpreting vendor statistics on malcode varieties
  - Vendor wants to boost public perception that huge malware populations exist
Malware

The AV-TEST Institute registers over 390,000 new malicious programs every day. These are examined using the analysis tools Sunshine and VTEST, classified according to their characteristics and saved. Visualisation programs then transform the results into diagrams that can be updated and produce current malware statistics.
Infection Cleanup

- Once malware detected on a system, how do we get rid of it?
- May require restoring/repairing many files
- This is part of what AV companies sell: per-specimen disinfection procedures
- What about if malware executed with administrator privileges?
  - "Game over man, Game Over!"
  - “Dust off and nuke the entire site from orbit. It’s the only way to be sure”
  - i.e., rebuild system from original media + data backups
- Malware may include rootkit in the kernel to hide its presence
Infection Cleanup, con’t

- If we have complete source code for system, we could rebuild from that instead, couldn’t we?
- No!
- Suppose forensic analysis shows that virus introduced a backdoor in /bin/login executable
  - (Note: this threat isn’t specific to viruses; applies to any malware)
- Cleanup procedure: rebuild /bin/login from source...
Regular compilation process of building login binary from source code

Compiler

/bin/login executable

/source code

/infected

Compiler recognizes when it's compiling /bin/login source and inserts extra back door when seen
No amount of careful source-code scrutiny can prevent this problem. And if the hardware has a back door …

Reflections on Trusting Trust
Turing-Award Lecture, Ken Thompson, 1983
This Was Done!!!

• By Ken Thompson
• "Reflections on Trusting Trust"

• And now bad guys are doing it too...
• Reports of malicious actors trojaning the build environment for games
Break

Random fact about... Anca Dragan

• She married a roboticist
• ...who proposed to her
• ...by actuating a Wall-E
• ...and having it reveal
• ...a Lego box with a ring
More On "Rootkits"

- If you control the operating system...
  - You can hide extremely well
- EG, your malcode is on disk...
  - So it will persist across reboots
- But if you try to *read the disk*...
  - The operating system just says "Uhh, this doesn't exist!"
Even More Places To Hide!

• In the BIOS/EFI Firmware!
  • So you corrupt the BIOS which corrupts the OS...
  • Really hard to find: Defense, *only* run cryptographically signed BIOS code as part of the Trusted Base

• In the disk controller firmware!
  • So the master boot record, when read on boot up corrupts the OS...
  • But when you try to read the MBR later... It is just "normal"
  • Again, defense is *signed code*: The Firmware will only load a signed operating system
  • Make sure the disk itself is *not trusted*!
Robust Rootkit Detection:
Detect the act of hiding...

- Do an "in-system" scan of the disk...
  - Record it to a USB drive
- Reboot the system with trusted media
  - So a known good operating system
- Do the same scan!
  - If the scans are different, you found the rootkit!
- For windows, you can also do a "high/low scan" on the Registry:
  - Forces the bad guy to understand the registry as well as Mark Russinovich (the guy behind Sysinternals who's company Microsoft bought because he understood the Registry better than Microsoft's own employees!)
- Forces a bind on the attacker:
  - Hide and persist? You can be detected
  - Hide but don't persist? You can't survive reboots!
Which Means **Proper** Malcode Cleanup...

I SAY WE TAKE OFF AND NUKLE THE ENETIRE SITE FROM ORBIT

IT'S THE ONLY WAY TO BE SURE.
Large-Scale Malware

• Worm = code that self-propagates/replicates across systems by arranging to have itself immediately executed
  • Generally infects by altering running code
  • No user intervention required
• Propagation includes notions of targeting & exploit
  • How does the worm find new prospective victims?
  • How does worm get code to automatically run?
• Botnet = set of compromised machines ("bots") under a common command-and-control (C&C)
  • Attacker can use a worm or other techniques to acquire the bots
Rapid Propagation

Worms can potentially spread quickly because they parallelize the process of propagating/replicating.

Same holds for viruses, but they often spread more slowly since require some sort of user action to trigger each propagation.
Worms

- Worm = code that self-propagates/replicates across systems by arranging to have itself immediately executed
  - Generally infects by altering running code
  - No user intervention required

- Propagation includes notions of targeting & exploit
  - How does the worm find new prospective victims?
    - One common approach: random scanning of 32-bit IP address space
      - Generate pseudo-random 32-bit number; try connecting to it; if successful, try infecting it; repeat
    - But for example “search worms” use Google results to find victims
  - How does worm get code to automatically run?
    - One common approach: buffer overflow ⇒ code injection
    - But a web worm could propagate using XSS
The Arrival of Internet Worms

- Worms date to Nov 2, 1988 - the *Morris Worm*
- Way ahead of its time
- Employed whole suite of tricks to *infect* systems ...
  - Multiple buffer overflows
  - Guessable passwords
  - “Debug” configuration option that provided shell access
  - Common user accounts across multiple machines
- ... and of tricks to *find* victims
  - Scan local subnet
  - Machines listed in system’s network config
  - Look through user files for mention of
Arrival of Internet Worms, con’t

- Modern Era began Jul 13, 2001 with release of initial version of Code Red
- Exploited known buffer overflow in Microsoft IIS Web servers
  - *On by default* in many systems
  - Vulnerability & fix announced previous month
- Payload part 1: web site defacement
  - HELLO! Welcome to http://www.worm.com!
  - Hacked By Chinese!
Payload part 2: check day-of-the-month and ...

- 1\textsuperscript{st} through 20\textsuperscript{th} of each month: spread
- 20\textsuperscript{th} through end of each month: attack
  - Flooding attack against 198.137.240.91 ...
  - ... i.e., www.whitehouse.gov

Spread: via \textit{random scanning} of 32-bit IP address space

- Generate pseudo-random 32-bit number; try connecting to it; if successful, try infecting it; repeat
- Very common (but not fundamental) worm technique
- Each instance used same random number seed

How well does the worm spread?

Linear growth rate
Code Red, con’t

- White House responds to threat of flooding attack by changing the address of www.whitehouse.gov
- Causes Code Red to die for date \( \geq 20^{th} \) of the month due to failure of TCP connection to establish.
- Author didn’t carefully test their code - buggy!
- But: this time random number generator correctly seeded.
The worm dies off globally!

Number of new hosts probing 80/tcp as seen at LBNL monitor of 130K Internet addresses

Measurement artifacts

The worm dies off globally!
Modeling Worm Spread

• Worm-spread often well described as infectious epidemic
  • Classic SI model: homogeneous random contacts
    • SI = Susceptible-Infectible

• Model parameters:
  • N: population size
  • S(t): susceptible hosts at time t.
  • I(t): infected hosts at time t.
  • \( \beta \): contact rate
    • How many population members each infected host communicates with per unit time
    • E.g., if each infected host scans 250 Internet addresses per unit time, and 2% of Internet addresses run a vulnerable (maybe already infected) server \( \Rightarrow \beta = 5 \)
    • For scanning worms, larger (= denser) vulnerable pop. \( \Rightarrow \) higher \( \beta \) \( \Rightarrow \) faster worm!

• Normalized versions reflecting relative proportion of infected/susceptible hosts
  • \( s(t) = S(t)/N \), \( i(t) = I(t)/N \)

\[
\begin{align*}
N &= S(t) + I(t) \\
S(0) &= I(0) = N/2
\end{align*}
\]
Computing How An Epidemic progresses

- In continuous time:

\[ \frac{dl}{dt} = \beta \cdot i \cdot \frac{S}{N} \]

Increase in # infectibles per unit time

Total attempted contacts per unit time

Proportion of contacts expected to succeed

- Rewriting by using \( i(t) = \frac{I(t)}{N}, S = N - I \):

\[ \frac{di}{dt} = \beta i(1 - i) \quad \Rightarrow \quad i(t) = \frac{e^{\beta t}}{1 + e^{\beta t}} \]

Fraction infected grows as a logistic
Fitting the Model to “Code Red”

Exponential initial growth

Growth slows as it becomes harder to find new victims!

Life Just Before Slammer

Map Source: www.caida.org

Sat Jan 25 05:29:00 2003 (UTC)

Number of hosts infected with Sapphire: 0

http://www.caida.org

Copyright (C) 2003 UC Regents
Life 10 Minutes After Slammer

Sat Jan 25 06:00:00 2003 (UTC)
Number of hosts infected with Sapphire: 74855
http://www.caida.org

Copyright (C) 2003 UC Regents
Going Fast: Slammer

- Slammer exploited connectionless UDP service, rather than connection-oriented TCP
- Entire worm fit in a single packet!
- ⇒ When scanning, worm could “fire and forget” Stateless!
- Worm infected 75,000+ hosts in <= 10 minutes
- At its peak, double every 8.5 seconds
The Usual Logistic Growth

Probes Recorded During Code Red's Reoutbreak

Number Seen in an hour

Hour of the day

# of scans
Predicted # of scans
Slammer’s Growth

What could have caused growth to deviate from the model?

Hint: at this point the worm is generating 55,000,000 scans/sec

Answer: the Internet ran out of carrying capacity!
(Thus, $\beta$ decreased.)
Access links used by worm completely clogged.
Caused major collateral damage.
Witty...

- A worm like Slammer but with a twist...
  - Targeted network intrusion detection sensors!
  - Released ~36 hours after vulnerability disclosure and patch availability!

- Payload wasn't just spreading, however...
  - while true {
    for i := range(20000) {
      send self to random target;
    }
    select random disk (0-7)
    if disk exists {
      select random block, erase it;
Stuxnet

- Discovered July 2010. (Released: Mar 2010?)
- Multi-mode spreading:
  - Initially spreads via USB (virus-like)
  - Once inside a network, quickly spreads internally using Windows RPC scanning
- Kill switch: programmed to die June 24, 2012
- Targeted SCADA systems
  - Used for industrial control systems, like manufacturing, power plants
- Symantec: infections geographically clustered
  - Iran: 59%, Indonesia: 18%, India: 8%
Stuxnet, con’t

- Used four Zero Days
- Unprecedented expense on the part of the author
- “Rootkit” for hiding infection based on installing Windows drivers with valid digital signatures
  - Attacker stole private keys for certificates from two companies in Taiwan
- Payload: do nothing ...
  - ... unless attached to particular models of frequency converter drives operating at 807-1210Hz
  - ... like those made in Iran (and Finland) ...
  - ... and used to operate centrifuges for producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons
Stuxnet, con’t

- Payload: do nothing ...
- ... unless attached to particular models of frequency converter drives operating at 807-1210Hz
- ... like those made in Iran (and Finland) ...
- ... and used to operate centrifuges for producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons

- For these, worm would slowly increase drive frequency to 1410Hz
- ... enough to cause centrifuge to fly apart ...
- ... while sending out fake readings from control system indicating everything was okay ...
- ... and then drop it back to normal range
Israel Tests on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay

By WILLIAM J. BROAD, JOHN MARKOFF and DAVID E. SANGER

Published: January 15, 2011

This article is by William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger.

The Dimona complex in the Negev desert is famous as the heavily guarded heart of Israel’s never-acknowledged nuclear arms program, where neat rows of factories make atomic fuel for the arsenal.

Over the past two years, according to intelligence and military experts familiar with its operations, Dimona has taken on a new, equally secret role — as a critical testing ground in a joint American and Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s efforts to make a bomb of its own.

Behind Dimona’s barbed wire, the experts say, Israel has spun nuclear centrifuges virtually identical to Iran’s at Natanz, where Iranian scientists are struggling to enrich uranium. They say Dimona tested the effectiveness of the Stuxnet computer worm, a destructive program that appears to have wiped out roughly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear
The "Toddler" Attack Payload...

- Stuxnet was very carefully engineered...
- Designed to only go off under very specific circumstances
- But industrial control systems are inherently vulnerable
  - They consist of sensors and actuators
  - And safety is a global property
- Generic Boom:
  - At zero hour, the payload sees that it is on control system:
    map the sensors and actuators, see which ones are low speed vs high speed
  - T+30 minutes: Start replaying sensor data, switch actuators in low-speed system
  - T+60 minutes: Switch all actuators at high speed...
- This has been done:
  A presumably Russian test attack on the Ukrainian power grid!
  ("CrashOverride" attack)
And NotPetya...

- NotPetya was a worm deliberately launched by Russia against Ukraine
  - Initial spread: A corrupted update to MeDoc Ukrainian Tax Software
  - Then spread within an institution using "Eternal Blue" (Windows vulnerability) and "Mimikatz"
    - Mimikatz is way **way more** powerful: Takes advantage of windows transitive authorization...
    - IF you are running on the admin's machine, you can take over the domain controller
    - IF you are running on the domain controller, you can take over **every computer**!!!

- Then wiped machines as fake ransomware
  - Give a veneer of deniability...
  - Shut down Mersk and many other global companies!
And Overall Taxonomy of Spread

- Scanning
  - Look for targets
  - Can be bandwidth limited
- "Target Lists"
  - Pregenerated (Hitlist)
  - On-the-host (Topological)
  - Query a third party server that lists servers (Metaserver)
- Passive
  - Wait for a contact: Infect with the counter-response
- More detailed taxonomy here:
Botnets

- Collection of compromised machines (bots) under (unified) control of an attacker (botmaster)
- Method of compromise decoupled from method of control
  - Launch a worm / virus / drive-by infection / etc.
  - (Or just buy the access – discussed later)
- Upon infection, new bot “phones home” to rendezvous w/ botnet command-and-control (C&C)
- Botmaster uses C&C to push out commands and updates
- Lots of ways to architect C&C:
  - Star topology; hierarchical; peer-to-peer
  - Encrypted/stealth communication
Centralized Botnet Command-and-Control (C&C)

Bot Herder/ Botmaster

Botnet Command and Control Server

Bots
Example of C&C Messages

1. Activation (report from bot to botmaster)
2. Email address harvests
3. Spamming instructions
4. Delivery reports
5. DDoS instructions
6. FastFlux instructions (rapidly changing DNS)
7. HTTP proxy instructions
8. Sniffed passwords report
9. IFRAME injection/report

From the “Storm” botnet circa 2008
Fighting Bots / Botnets

- How can we defend against bots / botnets?
- Approach #1: prevent the initial bot infection
  - Equivalent to preventing malware infections in general .... HARD
- Approach #2: Take down the C&C master server
Fighting Bots / Botnets

• How can we defend against bots / botnets?
• Approach #1: prevent the initial bot infection
  • Equivalent to preventing malware infections in general .... HARD
• Approach #2: Take down the C&C master server
  • Find its IP address, get associated ISP to pull plug
• Botmaster countermeasures?
  • Counter #1: keep moving around the master server
    • Bots resolve a domain name to find it (e.g. c-and-c.evil.com)
    • Rapidly alter address associated w/ name (“fast flux”)
  • Counter #2: buy off the ISP
Configurable Options

- Processor: 2x intel Xeon L6520
- Memory: 24 GB +$50
- Disks: 2000 GB +$45
- Network: 100 Mb/s (unlim.)
- Dedicated IP: 4 +$30
- Operating System: FreeBSD-10-amd64
- Panel: ISPmanager +$20
- Backup size: 6 GB +$10
- Administration: Optimum +$50

Getting a bulletproof server in Ukraine is actually a really good idea if you have limited options. If you can’t use servers in Russia or in other European countries, a Ukraine bulletproof server is an excellent choice.

The best part about bulletproof servers in Ukraine is its loose rules in content. You won’t have to worry about third parties complaining about your content because it’s pretty much a haven for Internet marketers operating any form of business online.

Add in the fact that traffic cost is relatively low, getting a bulletproof server in Ukraine makes so much sense for your business. Avail our special offer today.

Restrictions

Order now!
Subtotal: $604
If you want a truly authentic European quality connectivity, then our bulletproof VPS in Netherlands is the perfect pick for you.

With our promise of 100% uptime, you are getting an unbelievable deal. Because Netherlands have very friendly laws when it comes to content distribution, you can run websites and businesses that may contain sensitive content within Europe.

Simply put – if a certain content is banned to operate in other EU countries, it’s probably legal in Netherlands. So if you want a piece of that business, going with a Bulletproof VPS in Netherlands is a move you should make.

You can enjoy stellar security, uptime, privacy, and smooth operations from start to finish with our Netherlands bulletproof VPS service. Contact us today and feel the difference!

Restrictions

Order now!
Subtotal: $255

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<td>+$10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discs: 100 Gb</td>
<td>+$20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network: unlimited (100Mb/s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated IP: 2</td>
<td>+$15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating System: CentOS-6-amd64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel: ISPmanager</td>
<td>+$20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backup size: 50 Gb</td>
<td>+$10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration: Optimum</td>
<td>+$50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About Us

Who are we and what do we do?

Our company has been in business since 2009, when it was registered in an offshore zone of the Seychelles Islands.

Most of our work is focused on providing reliable bulletproof hosting with protection from any encroachment, maintaining our clients' rights to full freedom of information and independence.

We distribute information on trustworthy platforms in Russia, Ukraine, EU countries and China. There is plenty of room for another project on the internet – and we are prepared to provide you with it.

We have always carefully protected clients' websites from all attacks and claims. Our company policy, combined with experience, technical professionalism and time-tested arrangements with data centers guarantee that all data on our servers is fully protected from intervention by authorities, bothersome right holders, and organizations like Spammers.

We value and treasure freedom on the internet because this is one of the few places where it still remains.

What are the advantages of working with us?

Bulletproof protection

Our defining trait is our willingness to provide services which are not easily blocked by third parties. Unlike ordinary hosts, which terminate services upon receiving any sort of claim against their client, we do not let our customers be bullied. A wide variety of platforms and internal arrangements allow us to prevent attempts by ill-wishers to block your projects.

Experience

Our team has been working in the sphere of bulletproof hosting for over five years. Throughout this period, we've dealt with the toughest problems, provided services to the most diverse clients, cooperated with the most reliable partners and now wish to attain even more experience with your help.

An individual approach

Share your projects with us, and we will provide ideal conditions for their existence, given our skill in the technical and legal field.

We can do the following:

- Select a country whose current legislation will not impede the distribution of your materials;
- Find a platform that will best suit your requirements;
- Accept payment in any form convenient for you, including Bitcoin, which maintains the highest level of anonymity of online payments;
- Set up and configure hardware best suited for your projects;
- Provide high-quality, around-the-clock support for all of your project's stages;
- Guarantee protection from claims and abrupt failure of equipment;
- Ensure stable functioning of your project;
Imagine yourself spending so much time, money, and resources on your internet venture. Actually, you don’t even need to ‘imagine’ because I’m pretty sure you’ve spent a considerable amount of time and cash into making money online.

But if for some reason, your tactics are closer to blackhat and grayhat, then your hard work could be in jeopardy.

As you know, big companies like Google can just penalize your website whenever they please. Once they find out that you aren’t exactly playing by the rules, you could get the ban hammer.

Nevermind Google... How about your own government chasing you around for running a porn tube or an online gambling site? That’s a very serious issue that you surely don’t want to be part of.

You could end up paying a huge amount of cash to the government, or worse — get arrested.

Restrictions
They are few, but they do exist. We restrict ourselves within the confines of professional ethics, general human morality, and the law of countries our equipment is stationed in.

For these reasons, we do not support:

- email spam
- all forms of fraud
- child pornography
- fascism and terrorism
- violence
- activity deemed illegal in countries our equipment is stationed in
Approach #3: seize the domain name used for C&C

... Botmaster counter-measure?

Business counter-measure: bullet-proof domains
Bulletproof domain registration

Registration of bulletproof domains is conducted by our partners based in China. The reliability of our partners is clearly highlighted by over 5 years of our collaboration and thousands of registered domains.

Bulletproof domains are a must-have for undertaking projects with ample and fierce competition. With bulletproof domains, your project will finally be able to function, undeterred by adversaries’ attempts to block it through complaints to the domain registrar, while other domains registered from ordinary registrars get blocked in the same circumstances.

Don’t let yourself be pressured or threatened - register bulletproof domains!

Type in the domain you wish to register below to check for availability.

www. myhackersite.com GO!
**Bulletproof domain registration**

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```
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```

**Choose Domains**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domain Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>More Info</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>myhackersite.com</td>
<td>Available! Order Now</td>
<td>1 Year(s) @ $36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myhackersite.net</td>
<td>Available! Order Now</td>
<td>1 Year(s) @ $36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myhackersite.org</td>
<td>Available! Order Now</td>
<td>1 Year(s) @ $36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myhackersite.biz</td>
<td>Available! Order Now</td>
<td>1 Year(s) @ $36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myhackersite.info</td>
<td>Available! Order Now</td>
<td>1 Year(s) @ $36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myhackersite.name</td>
<td>Available! Order Now</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fighting Bots / Botnets, con’t

• Approach #3: seize the domain name used for C&C
• ... Botmaster counter-measure?
• Business counter-measure: bullet-proof domains
• Technical counter-measure: DGAs
  • Each day (say), bots generate large list of possible domain names using a Domain Generation Algorithm
  • Large = 50K, in some cases
  • E.g.: eqxowsn.info, ggegtugh.info, hquterpacw.net, oumaac.com, qfiadxb.net, rwyoehbkhdbh.info, rzziyf.info, vmlbhdvtnjr.org, yeiesmomgeso.org, yeuqik.com, yfewtvpnk.info, zffezlkgfnox.net
  • Bots then try a random subset looking for a C&C server
    • Server signs its replies, so bot can’t be duped
Fighting Bots / Botnets, con’t

• Approach #4: rally the community to sever bullet-proof hosting service’s connectivity
Spam Volumes Drop by Two-Thirds After Firm Goes Offline

The volume of junk e-mail sent worldwide plummeted on Tuesday after a Web hosting firm identified by the computer security community as a major host of organizations engaged in spam activity was taken offline. (Note: A link to the full story on McColo’s demise is available here.)

Experts say the precipitous drop-off in spam comes from Internet providers unplugging McColo Corp., a hosting provider in Northern California that was the home base for machines responsible for coordinating the sending of roughly 75 percent of all spam each day.

In an alert sent out Wednesday morning, e-mail security firm IronPort said:

In the afternoon of Tuesday 11/11, IronPort saw a drop of almost 2/3 of overall spam volume, correlating with a drop in IronPort’s SenderBase queries. While we investigated what we thought might be a technical problem, a major spam network, McColo Corp., was shutdown, as reported by The Washington Post on Tuesday evening.

Spamcop.net’s graphic shows a similar decline, from about 40 spam e-
Fighting Bots / Botnets, con’t

- Approach #4: rally the community to sever bullet-proof hosting service’s connectivity
- Botmaster countermeasure?
- Who needs to run a bot when you can buy
The Malware “Pay Per Install” (PPI) Ecosystem
Installs4Sale.net - надежный сервис по загрузкам, достойный доверия

Приемущества

- Быстро осуществляем отгрузку практически в любой регион. Принимаем заказы на ми克斯 стран по вашему выбору.
- Для постоянных клиентов действуют скидки и бонусы в виде дополнительного объема загрузок.

Контакты

- 550869331
- 550526933
- info [at] installs4sale.net
PPI Eco-system
PPI Eco-system
PPI Eco-system

Clients
- Fake AV
- Spambot
- Keylogger

PPI Service

PPI Affiliate
- Downloader
- Install
- Payment

Target Host
PPI Eco-system

1. Spambot leads to Fake AV, Keylogger
2. PPI Service to PPI Affiliate
3. Downloader, Install, Payment

Clients

Target Host
PPI Eco-system

Clients

Fake AV

Spambot

Keylogger

PPI Service

PPI Affiliate

Downloader

Install

Payment

Target Host
PPI Eco-system

1. Clients use fake AV and Spambot to install Keylogger.
2. PPI Affiliate installs Downloader to target host.
3. PPI Affiliate receives Payment.
4. PPI Service connects Clients, PPI Affiliate, and Target Host.

Dutra & Jawale
GangstaBucks.com - it pays on time!
We pay for all installs!

Join our ranks and by tomorrow you could get your first payout!
Prices are per *thousand* installs.
Fighting Bots / Botnets, con’t

- Approach #4: rally the community to sever bullet-proof hosting service’s connectivity
- Botmaster countermeasure?
- Who needs to run a bot when you can buy just-in-time bots ... !
- Approach #5: use the complexity of the malware infrastructure to undermine it ...
Infiltration opportunity

1. Reverse-engineer downloader protocol
2. Write emulator that fakes an
Intelligence via Infiltration...

“Milking” = mimic downloader, repeatedly ask PPI service for next program to install

Running for five months, Berkeley & UCSD researchers downloaded (“milked”) > 1M binaries (9K distinct) from 4 different affiliate programs
Malware Extracted via “Milking”

The majority of the world’s top malware appeared in the “milk”
Addressing The Botnet Problem

- What are our prospects for securing the Internet from the threat of botnets? What angles can we pursue?

- Angle #1: detection/cleanup
  - Detecting infection of individual bots hard as it’s the defend-against-general-malware problem
  - Detecting bot doing C&C likely a losing battle as attackers improve their sneakiness & crypto
  - Cleanup today lacks oomph:
    - Who’s responsible? ... and do they care? (externalities)
    - Landscape could greatly change with different model of liability

- Angle #2: go after the C&C systems / botmasters
  - Difficult due to ease of Internet anonymity & complexities of international law
    - But: a number of successes in this regard
    - Including some via peer pressure rather than law enforcement (McColo)
  - Policing domain name registrations?
Addressing The Problem, con’t

- **Angle #3: prevention**
  - Bots require installing new executables or modifying existing ones
  - Perhaps via infection …
    - … or perhaps just via user being fooled / imprudent

- **Better models?**
  - We could lock down systems so OS prohibits user from changing configuration
    - Sacrifices flexibility
    - How does this work for home users?
    - Can we leverage trusted kernels + white lists / code signing?
  - Or: structure OS/browser so code runs with Least Privilege
    - Does this solve the problem?
    - Depends on how granular the privileges are … and how the decision is made regarding just what privileges are “least”
Or Forget Fighting Botnets...

- Fight the **business models**!
- If bad guys can't make money, they stop doing it
- Managed to do this reasonably well for Viagra spam...
- But can we do this for other areas?
Worm Take-Aways

- Potentially enormous reach/damage
  - Weapon
- Hard to get right
- Emergent behavior / surprising dynamics
- Remanence: worms stick around
  - E.g. Slammer still seen in 2013!
- Propagation faster than human response