Elections, Computer Security, and Electronic Voting

C5161 4/19/2010 David Wagner



For Delegate to Congress. FRANCIS GEHON. For Representatives. John Firestow S.S. Lotheoh For County Commissioners. Abre Walcott John Morford Joh Aigins Cyrus Sarders LB. Mulholland John Hawkers For Constable. John Boyal.

REPUBLICAN TICKET.

For Mayor, M. F. FAIRCHILD.

For City Solicitor, J. P. DOLLIVER.

For City Assessor, L. G. SPRING.

For City Treasurer, BETH VINCENT.

For Councilman-4th Ward, A. H. JOHNSON.

REPUBLICAN TICKET.

STATE TICKET.

For Governor,
WILLIAM LARRABEE,
Of Fayette County.
For Lieutenant Governor,
JOHN A. T. HULL,
Of Polk County.
For Judge of the Supreme Court,
GIFFORD S. ROBINSON,
Of Buena Vista County.
For Superintendent of Public Instruction,
HENRY SABIN,
Of Clinton County.

County Ticket

For Senator Thirty-sixth District,
J. P. PATRICK.
For Representative Seventieth District,
W. W. GOODWIN.
For Auditor,
JULIUS H. BUHLMAN,
EVENT Treasurer.

For Sheriff,
WILLIAM WELLMAN.
For County Superintendent,
JAMES W. WYATT.
For Supervisor,
PATRICK COSTIGAN.
For Coroner,
L. L. RENSHAW.
For Surveyor,
SANFORD L. PECK.

Township Ticket.

For Trustee,

For Constable,

For Road Supervisor District No.....

10th District.

ADMINISTRATION UNION TICKET

> For Mayor, CALEB T. FAY

For County Judge. THOS. W. FREELON

For District Attorney. CHARLES H. PARKER

For County Clerk, JOHN A. MONROE

For Sheriff, THOMAS J. POULTERER

For Recordsr, to fill the vacancy for the inexpired term of G. W. Reckh, resigned.

GEORGE B. REEVE

For County Recorder, GEORGE B. REEVE

For City and County Treasurer, ASA T. LAWTON

For City and County Assessor, THOS. D. MATHEWSON

For City and County Surveyor, REED BIGLER

For Coroner DR. B. A. SHELDON

For Harbor Master CAPT. N. PROCTOR SMITH

For Superintendent of Common Schools JOHN H. BREWER

FITH Township.

Justice of the Peace. GEO. T. BOULDEN Constable. PHINEAS HOWARD, JE

"Subscription of Three Hundred Thousand Bollars, to the San Francisco and San Jose Rail-road Company." YES,

Polls—Brick Building westerly side of Third, between Folson and Harrison streets.



Security Goals for an Election


- · Integrity: No election fraud
- Transparency: Everyone especially the loser - must be able to verify that the election was conducted appropriately



 Privacy: No one learns how the voter has voted



 Secret ballot: Voter cannot prove how she voted



Breakthrough! — the Australian secret ballot.

Ballot printed by govt. Ballot boxes monitored by observers. Ballots counted, by hand, in public. Competing interests keep each other honest.




ABSENT VOTER BALLOT STUB A No. 7720



STUB B No. 7720 ABSENT VOTER BALLOT

IMPORTANT DO NOT DETACH STUB








Confusion at Palm Beach County polls

Some Al Gore supporters may have mistakenly voted for Pat Buchanan because of the ballot's design.

Although the Democrats are listed second in the column on the left, they are the third hole on the ballot.

Punching the second hole casts a vote for the Reform party.



Another anomaly during the 2000 election

From: Lana Hires

Subject: 2000 November Election


I need some answers! Our department is being audited by the County.


I have been waiting for someone to give me an explanation as to why Precinct 216 gave Al Gore a minus 16022 when it was uploaded. Will someone please explain this so that I have the information to give the auditor instead of standing here "looking dumb".












Press the candidate name or contest title to return to a contest.

Vote button will light up when you may cast your ballot.





Back

01

01



Question: How do election security goals apply to touchscreen (DRE) electronic voting machines?

- 1. Machine must allow each authorized voter to vote exactly once; must prevent tampering with votes after they are cast.
- 2. Machine should be verifiably trustworthy.
- 3. Machine must randomize the order in which votes were cast.
- 4. Machine must not give voter a "receipt".
- Security Goals for an Election:
 Integrity, Transparency, Privacy, Secret ballot

Nov 4, 2002: State of Georgia votes on Diebold DREs.

March 18, 2003: Diebold source code leaks.

July 23, 2003:

Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Avi Rubin, Dan Wallach, "Analysis of an Electronic Voting System".

The voter authorization protocol



QueryStatus

ACTIVE (0x01)

(record vote)

smartcard

SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Status = CANCELED

Succeeded

The voter authorization protocol



```
QueryStatus [Are you a valid card?]
```

```
ACTIVE (0x01) [Yup.]
```

(record vote)

smartcard

```
[Please cancel yourself.]
SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Status = CANCELED

Succeeded [Ok.]
```

Attack!

```
QueryStatus

ACTIVE (0x01)
```



(record vote)

SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Succeeded

malicious

smartcard

QueryStatus
ACTIVE (0x01)

(record another vote)

SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)

Succeeded

Authenticating election officials



What kind of card are you?

An administrator card.



What's the secret PIN?

2301



What's the secret PIN?

2301

Ok, you have admin access.



Source code excerpts

```
#define DESKEY ((des_key*)"F2654hD4")
```

```
DESCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp,
  (des_c_block*)record.m_Data, totalSize,
  DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT);
```

Source code excerpts

```
// LCG - Linear Congruential Generator -
// used to generate ballot serial numbers
// A psuedo-random-sequence generator
// (per Applied Cryptography, Bruce Schneier)
int lcgGenerator(int lastSN) {
  return ((lastSN*1366) + 150889)%714025;
}
```

"Unfortunately, linear congruential generators cannot be used for cryptography."

— Applied Cryptography, p.369

More than 4,500 North Carolina votes lost because of mistake in voting machine capacity

JACKSONVILLE, N.C. (AP) — More than 4,500 votes have been lost in one North Carolina county because officials believed a computer that stored ballots electronically could hold more data than it did. Scattered other problems may change results in races around the state.

Officials said UniLect Corp., the maker of the county's electronic voting system, told them that each storage unit could handle 10,500 votes, but the limit was actually 3,005 votes.

Machine error gives Bush 3,893 extra votes in Ohio

By John McCarthy, Associated Press

COLUMBUS, Ohio — An error with an electronic voting system gave President Bush 3,893 extra votes in suburban Columbus, elections officials said.

Franklin County's unofficial results had Bush receiving 4,258 votes to Democrat John Kerry's 260 votes in a precinct in Gahanna. Records show only 638 voters cast ballots in that precinct. Bush's total should have been recorded as 365.

Broward Vote-Counting Blunder Changes Amendment Result

POSTED: 1:34 pm EST November 4, 2004

BROWARD COUNTY, Fla. -- The Broward County Elections Department has egg on its face today after a computer glitch misreported a key amendment race, according to WPLG-TV in Miami.

Amendment 4, which would allow Miami-Dade and Broward counties to hold a future election to decide if slot machines should be allowed at racetracks, was thought to be tied. But now that a computer glitch for machines counting absentee ballots has been exposed, it turns out the amendment passed.

"The software is not geared to count more than 32,000 votes in a precinct. So what happens when it gets to 32,000 is the software starts counting backward," said Broward County Mayor Ilene Lieberman.

That means that Amendment 4 passed in Broward County by more than 240,000 votes rather than the 166,000-vote margin reported "embarrassing Wednesday night. That increase changes the overall statewide results in what had been a neck-and-neck race, one for which recounts had been going on today. But with news of Broward's error, it's clear amendment 4 passed.

Broward County Mayor
Ilene Lieberman says
voting counting error is an
"embarrassing mistake."

#33











SECRET SOFT WARE SECRET GOVERNMENT



California Top-to-Bottom Review

In 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen commissions a review of California's voting systems.

43 experts (led by David Wagner & Matt Bishop) examine voting systems used nationally.



Technical findings of the CA TTBR

All voting systems examined have serious security problems:

- None followed sound engineering principles expected of security-critical systems.
- All were vulnerable to viral attacks: one outsider could subvert all voting machines countywide

Example flaw (Premier system)

Bug: The code that reads data off the memory card has buffer overrun vulnerabilities.

Attack:

- 1. Attacker writes malicious code onto 1 card
- 2. When central PC reads votes off card on election night, it gets infected
- 3. Infected PC writes malicious code onto all cards used in the next election, infecting entire county

Quotes from the reports

"We found pervasive security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia software. Virtually every important software security mechanism is vulnerable to circumvention."


"Our study of the Diebold source code found that the system does not meet the requirements for a security-critical system. It is built upon an inherently fragile design and suffers from implementation flaws that can expose the entire voting system to attacks."

"The Hart software and devices appear to be susceptible to a variety of attacks which would allow an attacker to gain control of some or all of the systems in a county. [..] Many of these attacks can be mounted in a manner that makes them extremely hard to detect and correct. We expect that many of them could be carried out in the field by a single individual, without extensive effort, and without long-term access to the equipment."

Outcome of the CA TTBR

Bowen decertifies most DRE voting systems and imposes strict new procedural protections.

Result: Most Californians now vote on paper ballots.



Trojan Horses and the Insider Threat



Ronald Dale Harris

Employee, Gaming Control Board, 1983-1995

Arrested, Jan 15,1995 Convicted, Sept 23, 1997, for rigging slot machines

Attempted Trojan Horse in Linux Kernel

```
schedule();
      goto repeat;
if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) &&current->uid = 0)
      retval = -EINVAL:
retval = -ECHILD:
end_wait4:
current->state = TASK RUNNING;
```


Trojan Horses and Voting Machines

Malicious logic hidden by an insider might, e.g., record votes incorrectly to favor one candidate. How would we defend a voting system against this kind of insider threat?

Potential solutions:

- Verify that the software is free of Trojans and will work correctly on all future elections.
 (beyond the state of the art) Voting on Satan's computer.
- Assume sw might contain Trojans. Verify that sw worked correctly in this particular election. (voter-verified paper records + random audits)





	COMMISSIONERS FOR NATIONAL PASTIMES (Vote for Two)	
☐ JIM THORPE		
BILL RUSSELL		
JOE DIMAGGIO		
PEGGY FLEMING		
Write-in		
Write-in		
	COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN LITERATURE (Vote for One)	
☐ ERNEST HEMINGWAY		
WILLIAM FAULKNER		
OHN STEINBECK		
SINCLAIR LEWIS		
Write-in		
- Back Instruc	tions Page Summar	ry Next

A paper copy of your ballot, which may be used for recount or auditing purposes, will be printed before your vote is cast.

Touch the Print Ballot button to print and verify your ballot.

OR

Touch the Back button or one of the races on this screen to go make changes.

MINISTER OF PRESIDENT (Vote for One) ABRAHAM LINCOLN

POET LAUREATE (Vote for One) MINISTER OF CARL SANDBURG

COMMISSIONER OF (Vote for One)

TRANSPORTATION (Vote for One)

CHUCK YEAGER

COMIC RELIEF (Vote for One)

CAROL BURNETT

MINISTER OF ART (Vote for One) ALEXANDER CALDER

AMBASSADORS OF THE AMERICAN MUSICAL COMEDY (Vote for One pair)

GEORGE GERSHWIN and IRA GERSHWIN

Do you f ered by the Federal

No V

ESTION

Shall the City of Anytown, USA issue and sell its General Obligation Bonds not to exceed \$150,000,000; YES

Back

Print Ballot

Touch the Print Next Page button to print and verify the next page.
OR

Touch the Reject Ballot button to go back and make changes.

NOTE: you may reject your printed ballot a maximum of two times, after which you will no longer be allowed to make changes and printing your ballot will cast your vote. Contact a pollworker if you are experiencing difficulty with this process.

PRESIDENT

(Vote for One)

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

POET LAUREATE

(Vote for One)

CARL SANDBURG

COMMISSIONERS FOR NATIONAL PASTIMES

(Vote for Two)

No Vote Cast

No Vote Cast

COMMISSIONER OF AMERICAN LITERATURE

(Vote for One)

No Vote Cast

MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION (Vote for One)

CHUCK YEAGER

MINISTER OF COMIC RELIEF (Vote for One)

CAROL BURNETT

MINISTER OF ART

(Vote for One)

ALEXANDER CALDER

AMBASSADORS OF THE AMERICAN

Reject Ballot

Print Next Page

THE STREET, ST Famous Names Demonstration Ba... PRECINCT 1 **EXPERIMENTAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSONS ASSESSED.** IX ABRAHAM LINCOLN (NE) POET LAUREATE IXT CAN SANCBURG (NF) COMMISSIONERS FOR NATIONAL FA. .. No Vote Cast COPPLISSIONER OF AMERICAN LITE. No Vote Cast MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION DE DIECK YEATER OF MINISTER OF COMIC SELIEF DXI CARD REPORTS OF MENISTER OF ART ALDMANER CALLER OF AMEASEADORS OF THE AMERICAN ". (N) GEORGE GERSOWIN and 1 (NF)

SAMPLE BALLOT

N.C. STATE SENATE DISTRICT 25 You may vote for ONE WILLIAM R. (BILL) PURCELL	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE EM HUNT GWYN	AMENDMENT II Constitutional amendment to provide that the General Assembly may place the clear proceeds of civil penalities, civil forfeitures, and civil fines collected by a State agency in a
N.C. STATE HOUSE DISTRICT 69 You may vote for ONE	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE LISA BLUE THACKER	State fund to be used exclusively for maintaining free public schools. FOR AGAINST
	EM DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE	AMENDMENT III Constitutional amendment to provide for the first term of office for magistrates of the
You may vote for ONE	DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE W. DAVID McSHEEHAN	first term of crice for magistrates of the General Court of Justice to be two years and for subsequent terms to be four years. FOR AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF	NON PARTISAN OFFICES Additional instructions to Voter	
SUPREME COURT You may vote for ONE SARAH PARKER JOHN M. TYSON	If you wish to write in a name for any of the following offices, write the name in the blank space provided and completely fill in the oval to the left of the name in order for your vote to count.	
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF SUPREME COURT You may vote for ONE PRONNIE ANSLEY RACHELLEA HUNTER HOWARD E. MANNING, JR.	BROWN CREEK SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT SUPERVISOR You may vote for ONE JOHN C. SPRINGER	
○ BETSY McCRODDEN ○ FRED MORRISON, JR. ○ PAUL MARTIN NEWBY	STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS	
MARVIN SCHILLER JAMES A. WYNN, JR.	AMENDMENT I Constitutional amendment to promote local	
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS You may vote for ONE LINDA MoGEE BILL PARKER	economic and community development projects by (i) permitting the General Assembly to enact general laws giving occuries, cibies, and towns the power to finance public improvements associated with qualified private economic and community improvements within development districts, as long as the financing is secured by the additional tax revenues resulting from the enhanced property value within the development district and is not secured by a piedge of the local government's fath and credit or general taxing authority, which inancing is not subject to a referendum; and (ii) permitting the owners of property in the development district to agree to a minimum tax value for their property, which is binding on future owners as long as the development district is in existence.	
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS You may vote for ONE WANDA G. BRYANT ALICE C. STUBBS		
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS You may vote for ONE BARBARA JACKSON ALAN THORNBURG		
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISTRICT 20 You may vote for ONE CHRIS BRAGG	TURN OVER TO CONTINUE VOTING	J







Statistical audit


- After election, randomly choose 1% of machines and manually recount the paper records on those machines. If paper count ≠ electronic count, there was fraud.
- If » 100 machines cheat, detection is likely.
 Consequently: If paper count = electronic count,
 then no more than ~100 machines cheated.

Prover (Elec. Official) The tallies are $t_1, ..., t_n$ Show me the paper for machine i.


(voter-verified paper audit trail)

Verifier (skeptical voter)


Trends in e-voting technology



Adoption of paper records + random audits



Timeline



Conclusions

- E-voting security is hard, but...
- E-voting can be made secure and trustworthy, if it can be audited.

- Technical principles:
 - Two-person control, separation of duties
 - Statistical audit
 - Security against malicious insiders

Lessons

- Understand security requirements before you design & deploy an information system.
- · Independent review is valuable.
- Sometimes technical threats can be handled through non-technical defenses.
- Seek independent, end-to-end checks that the system is working properly.
- Securing systems against malicious insiders is extremely challenging.
- Business structure determines the technology that is built & deployed. If buyers cannot measure how secure a product is, be prepared for market failures.

