


Web Security: Vulnerabilities & Attacks


Slide credit: John Mitchell

Security User Interface



Safe to type your password?




Safe to type your password?






Safe to type your password?



Safe to type your password?



Mixed Content: HTTP and HTTPS



Mixed content and network attacks


- banks: after login all content over HTTPS
 - Developer error: Somewhere on bank site write

```
<script src=http://www.site.com/script.js>  
</script>
```
 - Active network attacker can now hijack any session
- Better way to include content:

```
<script src=//www.site.com/script.js> </script>
```

 - served over the same protocol as embedding page

The Status Bar




- Trivially spoofable

```
<a href="http://www.paypal.com/"  
  onclick="this.href = 'http://www.evil.com/';">  
  PayPal</a>
```

Command Injection

Background



Quick Background on PHP

display.php: `<? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>`


IN THIS EXAMPLE

<code><? <i>php-code</i> ?></code>	executes php-code at this point in the document
<code>echo expr:</code>	evaluates expr and embeds in doc
<code>system(call, args)</code>	performs a system call in the working directory
<code>"" , '"</code>	String literal. Double-quotes has more possible escaped characters.
<code>.</code>	(dot). Concatenates strings.
<code>\$_GET['key']</code>	returns <i>value</i> corresponding to the <i>key/value</i> pair sent as extra data in the HTTP GET request


LATER IN THIS LECTURE

<code>preg_match(Regex, String)</code>	Performs a regular expression match.
<code>proc_open</code>	Executes a command and opens file pointers for input/output.
<code>escapeshellarg()</code>	Adds single quotes around a string and quotes/escapes any existing single quotes.
<code>file_get_contents(file)</code>	Retrieves the contents of file.

Background



Background



Command Injection

display.php: `<? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>`

Q: Assuming the script we've been dealing with (reproduced above) for `http://www.example.net/display.php`. Which one of the following URIs is an attack URI?

Hint: Search for a URI Decoder to figure out values seen by the PHP code.

`%3B` -> ";"

`%20` -> " "

`%2F` -> "/"

- a. `http://www.example.net/display.php?get=rm`
- b. `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=rm%20-rf%20%2F%3B`
- c. `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=notes.txt%3B%20rm%20-rf%20%2F%3B%0A%0A`
- d. `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=%20%20%20%20%20`

Command Injection

`display.php: <? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>`

Q: Assuming the script we've been dealing with (reproduced above) for `http://www.example.net/display.php`. Which one of the following URIs is an attack URI?

Hint: Search for a URI Decoder to figure out values seen by the PHP code.
(URIs decoded)

- a. `http://www.example.net/display.php?get=rm`
- b. `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=rm -rf /;`
- c. `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=notes.txt; rm -rf /;`
- d. `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=`

Command Injection

display.php: `<? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>`

Q: Assuming the script we've been dealing with (reproduced above) for `http://www.example.net/display.php`. Which one of the following URIs is an attack URI?

Hint: Search for a URI Decoder to figure out values seen by

the PHP code.
(Resulting php)

- a. `<? echo system("cat rm"); ?>`
- b. `<? echo system("cat rm -rf /;"); ?>`
- c. `<? echo system("cat notes.txt; rm -rf /;"); ?>`
- d. `<? echo system("cat "); ?>`

Injection

- Injection is a general problem:
 - Typically, caused when data and code share the same *channel*.
 - For example, the code is “*cat*” and the filename the data.
 - But ‘;’ allows attacker to start a new command.

Input Validation

- Two forms:
 - Blacklisting: Block known attack values
 - Whitelisting: Only allow known-good values
- Blacklists are easily bypassed
 - Set of 'attack' inputs is potentially infinite
 - The set can change after you deploy your code
 - Only rely on blacklists as a part of a defense in depth strategy

Blacklist Bypass

Blacklist	Bypass
Disallow semicolons	Use a pipe
Disallow pipes and semi colons	Use the backtick operator to call commands in the arguments
Disallow pipes, semicolons and backticks	Use the \$ operator which works similar to backtick
Disallow rm	Use unlink
Disallow rm, unlink	Use cat to overwrite existing files

- *Ad infinitum*
- Tomorrow, newer tricks might be discovered

Input Validation: Whitelisting

display.php:

```
<?  
if(!preg_match("/^[a-z0-9A-Z.]*$/", $_GET['file'])) {  
    echo "The file should be alphanumeric."  
    return;  
}  
echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']);  
>
```

GETINPUT	PASSES?
notes.txt	Yes
notes.txt; rm -rf /;	No
security notes.txt	No

Input Escaping

display.php:

```
<?
#http://www.php.net/manual/en/function.escapeshellarg.php
echo system("cat ".escapeshellarg($_GET['file']));
?>
```

escapeshellarg() adds single quotes around a string and quotes/escapes any existing single quotes allowing you to pass a string directly to a shell function and having it be treated as a single safe argument

-- <http://www.php.net/manual/en/function.escapeshellarg.php>

GETINPUT	Command Executed
notes.txt	cat 'notes.txt'
notes.txt; rm -rf /;	cat 'notes.txt rm -rf /;'
mary o'donnel	cat 'mary o'\''donnel'

Use less powerful API

- The system command is too powerful
 - Executes the string argument in a new shell
 - If only need to read a file and output it, use simpler API
- ```
display.php: <? echo file_get_contents($_GET['file']); ?>
```
- Similarly, the *proc\_open* (executes commands and opens files for I/O) API
    - Can only execute one command at a time.

# Recap

- Command Injection: a case of *injection*, a general vulnerability
- Defenses against injection include input validation, input escaping and use of a less powerful API
- Next, we will discuss other examples of injection and apply similar defenses



# SQL Injection

# Background

- SQL: A query language for database
  - E.g., SELECT statement, WHERE clauses
- More info
  - E.g., <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL>


# Running Example

Consider a web page that logs in a user by seeing if a user exists with the given username and password.


```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '$_GET['user'].'" AND
 pwd = '$_GET['pwd'].'"");
if (pg_query_num($result) > 0) {
 echo "Success";
 user_control_panel_redirect();
}
```

It sees if results exist and if so logs the user in and redirects them to their user control panel.


# Background




# Background



# Background



# Background



# SQL Injection

**login.php:**

```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '". $_GET['user'] ."' AND
 pwd = '". $_GET['pwd'] ."'");
if (pg_query_num($result) > 0) {
 echo "Success";
 user_control_panel_redirect();
}
```

Q: Which one of the following queries will log you in as admin?

Hints: The SQL language supports comments via '--' characters.

- a. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='`
- b. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin--&pwd=foo`
- c. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f`



# SQL Injection

login.php:

```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '". $_GET['user'] ."' AND
 pwd = '". $_GET['pwd'] ."'");
if (pg_query_num($result) > 0) {
 echo "Success";
 user_control_panel_redirect();
}
```

Q: Which one of the following queries will log you in as admin?  
Hints: The SQL language supports comments via '--' characters.

- a. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='`
- b. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin--&pwd=foo`
- c. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f`

# SQL Injection

login.php:

```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '" . $_GET['user'] . "' AND
 pwd = '" . $_GET['pwd'] . "'");
if (pg_query_num($result) > 0) {
 echo "Success";
 user_control_panel_redirect();
}
```

URI: <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f>

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = 'admin'--' AND pwd = 'f';");
```

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = 'admin';");
```

# SQL Injection

Q: Under the same premise as before, which URI can delete the users table in the database?

- a. `www.example.net/login.php?user=;DROP TABLE users;--`
- b. `www.example.net/login.php?user=admin%27%3B%20DROP%20TABLE%20users--%3B&pwd=f`
- c. `www.example.net/login.php?user=admin;%20DROP%20TABLE%20users;%20--&pwd=f`
- d. It is not possible. (None of the above)

# SQL Injection

Q: Under the same premise as before, which URI can delete the users table in the database?

- a. `www.example.net/login.php?user=;DROP TABLE users;--`
- b. `www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'; DROP TABLE users;--&pwd=f` (Decode d)
- c. `www.example.net/login.php?user=admin; DROP TABLE users; --&pwd=f`
- d. It is not possible. (None of the above)

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = 'admin'; DROP TABLE users;--' AND
 pwd = 'f';");
```

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE uid = 'admin';
 DROP TABLE users;");
```

# SQL Injection

- One of the most exploited vulnerabilities on the web
- Cause of massive data theft
  - 24% of all data stolen in 2010
  - 89% of all data stolen in 2009
- Like command injection, caused when attacker controlled data interpreted as a (SQL) command.

# Injection Defenses

- Defenses:
  - Input validation
    - Whitelists untrusted inputs to a safe list.
  - Input escaping
    - Escape untrusted input so it will not be treated as a command.
  - Use less powerful API
    - Use an API that only does what you want
    - Prefer this over all other options.

# Input Validation for SQL

login.php:

```
<?
if(!preg_match("/^[a-z0-9A-Z.]*$/", $_GET['user'])) {
 echo "Username should be alphanumeric."
 return;
}
// Continue to do login query
?>
```

| GET INPUT                    | PASSES ? |
|------------------------------|----------|
| Pikachu                      | Yes      |
| Pikachu'; DROP TABLE users-- | No       |
| O'Donnell                    | No       |

# Input Validation for SQL

Given that our web application employs the input validation mechanism for usernames, which of the following URIs would still allow you to login as admin?

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '$_GET['user']' AND
 pwd = '$_GET['pwd']';");
```

- a. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd=admin>
- b. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='%20R%201%3D1;-->
- c. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f>
- d. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='-->



# Input Validation for SQL

Given that our web application employs the input validation mechanism for usernames, which of the following URIs would still allow you to login as admin? (%3D -> "=")

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '$_GET['user']' AND
 pwd = '$_GET['pwd']';");
```

- a. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd=admin>
- b. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='%20R%201%3D1;-->
- c. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f>
- d. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='-->

# Input Validation for SQL

Given that our web application employs the input validation mechanism for usernames, which of the following URIs would still allow you to login as admin?

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '$_GET['user']' AND
 pwd = '$_GET['pwd']';");
```

b. <http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd=' OR 1=1;-->

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = 'admin' AND
 pwd = ' OR 1 = 1;--';");
```

# Input Validation for SQL

Given that our web application employs the input validation mechanism for usernames, which of the following URIs would still allow you to login as admin?

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 uid = '$_GET['user']' AND
 pwd = '$_GET['pwd']';");
```

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
 (uid = 'admin' AND pwd = '') OR
 1 = 1;--'");
```

1=1 is true everywhere. This returns all the rows in the table, and thus number of results is greater than zero

# Input Escaping

```
$_GET['user'] = pg_escape_string($_GET['user']);
$_GET['pwd'] = pg_escape_string($_GET['pwd']);
```

***pg\_escape\_string()*** escapes a string for querying the PostgreSQL database. It returns an escaped literal in the PostgreSQL format.

| GETINPUT                   | Escaped Output              |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Bob                        | Bob                         |
| Bob'; DROP TABLE users; -- | Bob''; DROP TABLE users; -- |
| Bob' OR '1'='1             | Bob'' OR ''1''=''1          |

## Use less powerful API : Prepared Statements

- Create a template for SQL Query, in which data values are substituted.
- The *database* ensures untrusted value isn't interpreted as command.
- Always prefer over all other techniques.
- Less powerful:
  - Only allows queries set in templates.

# Use less powerful API : Prepared Statements

<?

```
The $1 and $2 are a 'hole' or place holder for what will be filled by the data
$result = pg_query_params('SELECT * FROM users WHERE
 uid = $1 AND
 pwd = $2', array($_GET['user'], $_GET['pwd'])) ;
```

# Compare to

```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE
 uid = '$_GET['user']' AND
 pwd = '$_GET['pwd']'");
```

?>

# Recap

- SQL Injection: a case of *injection*, in database queries.
- Extremely common, and pervasively exploited.
- Use prepared statements to prevent SQL injection
  - **DO NOT** use escaping, despite what xkcd says.
- Next, injection in the browser.